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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Deterring Torture:
The Preventive Power of Criminal Law
and its Promise for Inhibiting State
Abuses
Francesca Laguardia*
ABSTRACT
The use of torture in the War on Terror reinvigorated a longstanding debate
about how to prevent such human rights violations, and whether they should
be criminalized. Using US history as a case study, this article argues that the
criminal sanction is likely to be more successful in preventing such abuses
than many other often suggested methods. Analyzing thousands of pages of
released government documents as an archive leads to the counterintuitive
finding that torturers were often deterred, at least momentarily, by fear of
criminal liability, and would have been successfully deterred if not for the
lack of prior prosecutions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Immediately following the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) requested authority to detain and interrogate
suspected terrorists, an authority that was quickly granted.1 By December

*		 Francesca Laguardia is Assistant Professor, Justice Studies, Montclair State University. J.D.
2007, Ph.D. 2012, Institute for Law and Society, New York University. Former Director of
Research, Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. The author is extremely grateful
to David Greenberg, Mihaela Serban, Jessica Henry, Venezia Michaelson, CalvinJohn Smiley,
Gabriel Rubin, Stephen Schulhofer, Candace McCoy, Charles Strozier, George Andreopoulos,
John Kleinig, and Mihaela Serban for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
		1. John Rizzo, 9/11: Three Major Mistakes, Defining Ideas (8 Sept. 2011), available at http://
www.hoover.org/research/911-three-major-mistakes.
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of 2002, reporters were exposing rumors that United States government
agents were using stress positions and other physically coercive methods
to gather intelligence from detainees seized in the War on Terror.2 In 2004,
pictures of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib detention facility became public,
as did the first of the legal memos, written for the White House, authorizing the use of torture.3 By 2006, the field of human rights scholarship was
flooded with articles and reports attempting to prove the criminality of the
US government’s torture policy; a government sanctioned, institutionalized,
gross violation of human rights.4
But this strategy of criminalization and prosecution of human rights
violations, while lauded by activist organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,5 has also been heavily criticized. Scholars
have cited evidence that such changes have resulted in more careful abuse,
rather than substantive change.6
This article argues that such pessimism ignores the promise of deterrence
for the social control of states. Using the Unites States’ formal utilization of
torture as a case study, this article suggests several points at which actors
in the process of legitimizing and employing torture were deterred. Indeed,
contemporary analyses of deterrence offer reasons to believe that similarly
situated persons, generally high level government employees, are likely to be
deterred from abuse if they believe their actions might qualify as criminal.
At the same time, the development of the United States’ torture policy gives
reason to believe that efforts to socialize populations or build institutional
oversight (standard noncriminal solutions to the problem of state violations
of human rights) are unlikely to be as effective as the personal deterrence
of government actors.
		 2.

		3.
		4

		5.

		 6.

Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse But Defends Interrogations: “Stress
and Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,
Wash. Post, 26 Dec. 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356_pf.html.
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005); Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (2004).
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 Case W. J. Int’l. L. 389 (2006); Amnesty Int’l, United States of America:
Human Dignity Denied: Torture and Accountability in the “War on Terror,” Index No. AMR
51/145/2004 (2004); Human Rights First, Attorney General Confirmation Hearings, Background
Papers on Alberto Gonzales: Torture, Executive Power, the Geneva Conventions and Military
Commissions (2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/
brief_20041220_Gonz_all.pdf.
Id.; Amnesty Int’l, USA: Crimes and Impunity (2015), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
sites/default/files/cia_torture_report_amr_5114322015.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Getting
Away With Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees (2011); see also
Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 Cornell
L. Rev. 1069 (2015).
Courtenay Ryals Conrad & Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture? 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
459 (2010); Darius M. Rejali, Torture and Democracy (2007); Charles R. Epp, The Rights
Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (1998); James
Ron, Varying Methods of State Violence, 51 Int’l Org. 275 (1997).
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This article begins with a brief description of the current state of research
on curbing abuse by states in emergency. I then turn to current research on
deterrence, and note the likelihood that individuals in prestigious positions
after long careers are particularly deterrable.
After describing my methodology, I explain why those persons instituting torture in the United States fit the category of highly deterrable actors.
I then use the history of the torture policy to illustrate the fact that federal
agents (both CIA agents and attorneys) were intensely concerned with the
threat of criminal sanctions, and that they changed their behavior based on
that concern. In sharp contrast to the fictional depiction of the dedicated spy
who acts in spite of the knowledge that he will be abandoned by his country
the moment he is discovered, CIA agents in the thick of the interrogation
program showed a firm interest in ensuring they would not be prosecuted,
and refused to act until those assurances were given. Those moments when
the approval was sought, and the fact that CIA agents refused to move forward until it was received, are moments when we can see the strength and
deterrent effects of criminal law. At the same time, the CIA’s self-protective
secrecy successfully disabled common mechanisms of oversight, including
public outcry, institutional oversight, and the socialization of elites.
I conclude that activists have ignored traditional criminological reasoning to their own detriment, and that (as is logically suggested by deterrence
theory), prosecutions are necessary in order to successfully prevent future
reoccurrences of this crime.
A. A Note on Terminology
Throughout this article, I refer to the tactics used by the CIA as torture. This
term has been hotly debated, as is the extent to which CIA agents understood
their actions to qualify as such. To some, there is a vital distinction between
“torture,” and “merely” inhumane and degrading, or abuse.7
But these qualifications only matter in the context of legal proceedings.
Those activists and organizations that work to make human rights abuses
illegal uniformly agree that the CIA’s conduct was torture.8 A plain language
understanding of the word torture would be satisfied with the infliction of
severe pain, particularly with the intent of gaining information from someone.9 Alvin Krongard, who held the third highest position in the CIA from
		7.

		8.
		9.

Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a “Common Conscience”: Reflections on the Current
Debate About Torture. 1 J. Nat’l. Sec. L. & Pol’y. 231 (2005); Michael M. Lewis, A Dark
Descent into Reality: Making the Case for an Objective Definition of Torture, 67 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 77 (2010).
Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5; Human Rights Watch, supra note 5; Amnesty Int’l, supra note
4; Human Rights First, supra note 4.
See Merriam-Webster dictionary’s definition of torture, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/torture.2015.
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2001-2004, recently echoed this sentiment. He stated, “[CIA tactics were]
meant to make [detainees] as uncomfortable as possible. So I assume for,
without getting into semantics, that’s torture. We were told by legal authorities that we could torture people.”10
Krongard’s statement highlights the fact that actors implementing torture
policy were highly concerned with whether or not their torture was legal, or
more accurately, whether using torture would put them at risk of criminal
sanctions, even while they were aware that their actions fit the category of
social harms the Torture Statute was written to prevent.11 Yet countless scholarly works have been mired in arguments about whether or not the extreme
abuse utilized by the Bush Administration amounted to torture. Rather than
compound this confusion, I use the word “torture” to describe these actions.
B. Preventing Human Rights Abuses: The State of the Field
Determining what stops governments from abusing human rights (for instance, by instituting torture) has become one of the great projects of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.12 While acceptance of human
rights treaties and increasing passage of human rights legislation generated
hope among advocates, these formal legal outcomes have largely proven
to be “empty promises,” as states have continued to engage in abuses and
repression.13 The pessimism regarding the law’s potential to change state
practices is even more extreme regarding states in emergency.14 In regards to
torture specifically, research and long debated political philosophies suggest
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

Dan Froomkin. New Effort to Rebut Torture Report Undermined as Former Official
Admits the Obvious, The Intercept, 5 Aug. 2015, available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/08/05/new-campaign-rebut-torture-allegations-undermined-former-officialadmits-obvious/.
Definition of Torture Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A, 28 Op. O.L.C. 297 (2004), available
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2004/12/31/op-olc-v028-p0297.
pdf.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International
Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. Peace Res. 407 (2007).
Id.; Conrad & Moore, supra note 6; Rejali, supra note 6; Epp, supra note 6; Ron, supra
note 6; A. E. Dick Howard, The Essence of Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism and
Human Rights: America: Poland, and France: A Bicentennial Colloquium at the Miller Center
3 (Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993,
43 Int’l Stud. Q. 291 (1999); Claudio Grossman, States of Emergency: Latin America
and the United States, in Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States
Constitution Abroad 176, 188 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Jose Luis
Cea, Chile’s Difficult Return to Constitutional Democracy, 20 PS 665 (1987); Hugo E.
Frühling, Human Rights in Constitutional Order and in Political Practice in Latin America,
in Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transition in the Contemporary World 85 (Douglas
Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero & Steven C. Wheatley eds., 1993).
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that reluctance to engage in torture is substantially diminished in the face
of a violent threat to the state.15
Still, researchers have found reason to hope that state abuses of human
rights can be prevented. Some have focused on institutional constraints,
including the ability of an independent judiciary to oversee executive excesses.16 Some look to the presence of training programs (within organizations
responsible for detention) that emphasize the importance of human rights
and the possible penalties for violations.17 Constructivist scholars have argued
that implementation of human rights norms requires the internalization of
those norms among governmental elites.18
Scholars have also suggested that human rights advocates, among the
populace, the international community, and the NGO community, might
apply sufficient pressure to force states to abide by human rights-protective
treaties.19 However, this claim is subject to substantial criticism by skeptics
focusing on the long history of human rights violations in the face of constitutional and international proscriptions.20
These methods exhibit a fundamental flaw, in that they rely on discovery
of abuse by human rights (or rule of law) advocates. In the case of interfer-

15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

Conrad & Moore, supra note 6, at 468; Christian A. Davenport, Will H. Moore &
David Armstrong The Puzzle of Abu Ghraib: Are Democratic Institutions a Palliative or
Panacea? (8 Dec. 2007) (unpublished, University of Maryland), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1022367; see also Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty
Hands, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 160 (1973).
Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate, & Steven C. Poe, Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier
to Human Rights Abuse?, 71 J. Pol. 644 (2009); Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law
in Human Rights Protection, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 87 (1999); Gerard J. Blasi & David
Louis Cingranelli, Do Constitutions and Institutions Help Protect Human Rights?, in 4
Policy Studies and Developing Nations: Human Rights and Developing Countries 223 (David
Louis Cingranelli ed., 1996); Christian A. Davenport, “Constitutional Promises” and
Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil
Liberties are Suppressed, 58 J. Pol. 627 (1996); L.W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Review, 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.59 (1989); Subrata
Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human
Rights Norms in a State of emergency (1989).
Conrad & Moore, supra note 6.
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L. J. 621 (2004); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn
Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (1999); Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (1998); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (1996).
Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 12; Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights:
International law in Domestic Politics (2009); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones:
Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 Int’l Org. 689 (2008);
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary
World, 19 Soc. F. 63 (2004); Risse et al, supra note 18; Keck & Sikkink, supra note 18;
see Conrad & Moore, supra note 6.
Epp, supra note 6; Howard, supra note 13.
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ence from NGOs or the public, pressure to abandon torture appears only
after the torture has been discovered. Similarly, in order for institutional
oversight to successfully prevent torture, there must be: 1) government
actors who are sufficiently committed to anti-torture norms that they will
interfere with plans to torture; and, 2) iron-clad mechanisms by which plans
to torture will be discovered. As is shown below, the existence of holes in
these defenses—either a failure to socialize every single government actor
or a failure to make mechanisms of discovery iron-clad-will will be seized
upon by a motivated government.
Finally, order for abuse to be discovered, it must occur in the first place.
In contrast, prevention has always been one of the primary purposes of
criminal law.21 Rather than interrupting or punishing abuse, it would be far
preferable to prevent its occurrence entirely. Perhaps surprisingly, criminal
sanctions offer great promise in this regard.
C. The Promise of Deterrence
The preventive potency of the threat of criminal prosecution may surprise
readers, as many of the hurdles facing the institutional solutions above
should also prove problematic for the strength of deterrence. Moreover, every
crime committed in the United States today stands as a stark reminder that
deterrence fails regularly.22
But research suggests that, for certain people, deterrence can be effective. And an examination of the CIA’s use of torture leads to the conclusion
that many of those factors that increase the efficacy of deterrence may be
particularly present in the types of individuals who are likely to become
official torturers in established democracies.
While formal sanctions may themselves be rather ineffective at deterring
potential criminals,23 the shame associated with those sanctions may have a
strong deterrent effect.24 Alex Piquero et al. relate this effect to the strength
of the (potential) offender’s social bonds, an argument that has much support in criminological literature.25 According to this research, offenders who

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (2014).
David M. Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction
(2009).
Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of
Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 Just. Q. 173 (1987).
John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond
Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27
L. & Soc’y Rev. 467 (1993).
Alex R. Piquero, Raymond Paternoster, Greg Pogarsky & Thomas Loughran, Elaborating
the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci.
335 (2011).
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have made a large investment in social conformity will be highly unlikely
to threaten their standing by breaking the law and risking formal sanctions
(which would indicate, socially, a sharp break from conformity).26
Investments in conformity would include successful employment.27 Satisfying employment and careers rather than “jobs” are particularly related
to successful social control.28 They offer a reason to conform and greater
social investment.29
Additionally, criminal sanctions more effectively deter individuals who
exhibit greater self-control and constraint.30 For deterrence to be effective,
individuals must rationally evaluate the possible repercussions of their actions. Therefore, only those who are predisposed to engage in analysis of
future repercussions may be deterred.31
It may be in part for this reason that studies suggest criminal regulation
has a strong deterrent effect on potential white-collar offenders.32 This effect
appears to be related to the fact that potential white-collar criminals are
particularly concerned about their reputation and social standing.33
The same might be said of attempts to deter elite government officials
debating the use of torture. The very nature of the positions these individuals
hold constitutes investment in social conformity. Even without assuming that

26.

27.

28.
29.

30.
31.
32.

33.

Id.; Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Personal Capital and Social Control: The
Deterrence Implications of a Theory of Individual Differences in Criminal Offending, 32
Criminology 581 (1994); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal
Threat in Crime Control (1973).
Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance Over the Life Course: The
Salience of Adult Social Bonds, 55 Am. Soc. Rev. 609 (1990); John H. Laub & Robert J.
Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime,
31 Criminology 301 (1993).
Neal Shover, Great Pretenders: Pursuits and Careers of Persistent Thieves (1996); Troy Duster,
Crime, Youth Unemployment, and the Black Urban Underclass, 33 Crime & Delinq. 300
(1987).
Christopher Uggen, Ex-Offenders and the Conformist Alternative: A Job Quality Model
of Work and Crime, 46 Soc. Probs. 127 (1999); Laub & Sampson, supra note 27; Jackson
Toby, Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the
Predatory Behavior of Hoodlums, 48 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 121 (1957).
Piquero et al, supra note 25; Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 24; Michael R. Gottfredson
& Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (1990); Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 26.
Piquero et al, supra note 25; Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 24; Gottfredson & Hirschi,
supra note 30; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 26.
Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research, 8 Ohio
State J. Crim. L. 481 (2011); Sally S. Simpson, Joel Garner & Carole Gibbs, Why do Corporations Obey Environmental law? Assessing Punitive and Cooperative Strategies of Corporate Crime
Control (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220693.pdf; Mark
A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and
Enforcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10245 (2000).
Sally S. Simpson, Carole Gibbs, Melissa Rorie, Lee Ann Slocum, Mark A. Cohen, & Michael Vandenbergh, An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control
Strategies, 103 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 231, 238–39 (2013); Simpson et al., supra note
32.
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individuals who choose to work in law enforcement may have heightened
belief in conventional norms and legality, a long and successful career is, in
itself, a social investment—one made by most authors of the torture policy,
and likely to add to the deterrent effect of criminal prohibitions.
D. Methodology
In analyzing the development of the US policy of torture, I look to the reports
and documents that have been released by the government over the past
ten years. In 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began an
investigation into the use of torture by US government agents. Eventually,
SASC released not only the declassified portions of the report, but supporting documents related to their investigation.34 Additionally, investigations
into later discoveries that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of interrogation
sessions led to the release of additional documents, as did the CIA Inspector
General’s investigation into the controversy35 and the investigation by the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) at the Department of Justice.36
These included faxes and emails between attorneys and officials describing
the legal reasoning as it evolved, and notes from meetings concerning the
practices. Finally, and most recently, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a detailed report on the development of the CIA’s
use of “Enhanced Interrogation Tactics”.37
Using these documents, I analyzed the development of the torture policy
to determine the thought processes and motivations of the lawyers who attempted to justify torture in the post-2001 era. While these documents remain
incomplete, and therefore limited, they corroborate each other in multiple
areas, including timeline and stated purpose. The candid nature of notes,
drafts, and emails adds to their reliability. Together, they offer an archival
history of the development of the legal reasoning used to justify torture.

34.
35.
36.

37.

Senate Armed Services Committee, US Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S.
Custody (2008), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Activities (Sept. 2001–Oct. 2003) (2004), available at https://fas.org/irp/
cia/product/ig-interrog.pdf.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation Into the Office of Legal
Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of
‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists (2009), available at https://www.
aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_20100719_
declassifications.pdf.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program Executive Summary (2014), available at https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/
sscistudy1.pdf.
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II. TORTURERS’ POTENTIAL TO BE DETERRED
The decision to utilize torture is not (and was not) made by low-level officers
or recent hires. To the contrary, the program was debated and created with
the input of the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, CIA Deputy Director of
Operations, James Pavitt, Chief of the Counterterrorism Center, Joseph Cofer
Black, and Black’s successor at the Counterterrorism Center, Jose Rodriguez.38
The SSCI Report describes an interrogation program conceived of and run by
“CIA Headquarters,” implying consistent oversight by high-level members of
the CIA. For instance, while Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel
at CIA Headquarters discussed the use of coercive interrogation techniques
against Abu Zubaydah and the “CIA Headquarters formally proposed that
Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that
Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted,
that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number
of people interact with him.”39
These high level CIA officials are almost certainly long-term CIA employees with a high level of investment in the agency. As an example, Alfreda
Bikowsky, one of the primary actors in the CIA’s torture policy, appears to
have had an almost ten-year career in the CIA prior to the commencement
of the enhanced interrogation program.40 Over the course of her career
she was promoted several times.41 George Tenet had worked his way up
from public schools and state college to a Master’s degree from Columbia

38.
39.
40.

41.

See, e.g., id. at 11–13, 37, 41, 43.
Id. at 26.
While Bikowsky’s biography has been removed from government web pages, she is
described in Jane Mayer’s The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned
into a War on American Ideals 34–36 (2008) as a former soviet analyst who was brought
in to Alec Station by Michael Scheuer when it was set up in 1996, suggesting that she
had already worked at the CIA prior to that time. She is similarly identified as “a former
Soviet analyst who has worked in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and in the al Qaeda
unit since the mid-1990s,” by Matthew Cole in one of the first articles identifying her
as a key to the CIA’s use of rendition and torture, Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping
CIA Deception on “Torture” Program, NBC News, 16 Dec. 2014, available at http://
www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/bin-laden-expert-accused-shaping-cia-deceptiontorture-program-n269551. While unnamed in these articles, the agent was later identified
as Bikowsky in Glenn Greenwald & Peter Maass, Meet Alfreda Bikowsky, the Senior
Officer at the Center of the CIA’s Torture Scandals, The Intercept, 19 Dec. 2014, available
at https://theintercept.com/2014/12/19/senior-cia-officer-center-torture-scandals-alfredabikowsky/; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, 2 Nov.
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/
AR2005110101644.html.
Jane Mayer, supra note 40, at 273; see Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, CIA Officers
Make Grave Mistakes, Get Promoted, Associated Press, 9 Feb. 2011, available at http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/41484983/ns/us_news-security/t/cia-officers-make-grave-mistakesget-promoted/#.WC32eLIrK70; see also Greenwald & Maass, supra note 40.
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University.42 He began working for the Senate in 1982 and eventually became Staff Director for the SSCI.43 Tenet worked in the SSCI for eight years,
then two years at the National Security Council, before becoming Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Director of Central Intelligence two
years after that.44
Similarly, Jose Rodriguez was employed by the CIA for over two decades
before being selected to head the Counter Terrorism Center, achieving a series
of promotions over that time.45 James Pavitt progressed from an intelligence
officer in the Army to a legislative assistant in the House of Representatives,
to a career in the CIA that spanned twenty-four years and a series of senior
positions (Chief of Station, Chief of the Directorate of Operation’s Counterproliferation Division) and culminated in his position as Deputy Director of
Operations from 1999–2004.46 Cofer Black’s career at the CIA lasted nearly
three decades, including roles such as Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of
the Latin American Division.47
Careers such as these are to be expected at high levels of government
office—they consist of decades of increasing responsibility and increasing
prestige, which suggest a high level of investment. We should expect that
high achieving government actors would be reluctant to lose these positions,
as tends to occur when criminal activity is revealed.48
The successes of these individuals also imply their own capacity for selfcontrol and analysis of future repercussions. Indeed, these are individuals
in jobs that specifically require future oriented analysis and evaluation of
possible repercussions from foolish actions. We should expect that career
employees would display low levels of impulsivity, at least in regards to their
professional reputations, and high levels of forethought.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47
48.

Anne E., James Kornblut, Jere Rutenberg & Hester, A Hungry Kid May Lead CIA, Daily
News, 21 Mar. 1997, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/hungrykid-lead-cia-article-1.763910; George Tenet Fast Facts, CNN, 29 Dec. 2015, available
at http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/06/us/george-tenet-fast-facts/index.html.
Nomination of George J. Tenet to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before
the Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Hrg. 105–314, 105th Cong. (1997), available
at http://fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/tenet.pdf.
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In other words, we might assume that high-level state officials would be
some of the most deterrable potential offenders. The personal characteristics
and situations of these individuals fall into categories of potential offenders
who are most likely to be deterred by formal sanctions and the informal
losses that would follow. These individuals are likely to look for and avoid
the social stigma, loss of prestige, and personal difficulties associated with
criminal prosecution.
And in fact, this is what we see in multiple reports and released documents describing the CIA’s utilization of torture. Indeed, the success of the
threat of prosecution in deterring government actors considering the use
of torture is shocking, given the level of secrecy these actors secured for
themselves. While deterrent effect is heavily dependent on the perceived
likelihood of apprehension,49 government actors debating the use of torture
were deterred several times, even while confident in their insulation from
oversight. They modified their actions based on the possibility of prosecution. They hesitated before utilizing torture and at times, for brief periods,
they stopped.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORTURE POLICY
As I noted above, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the
CIA immediately became interested in the use of torture.50 But the speed
of the CIA’s interest in interrogation is rivaled by its concern over criminal
prosecution. Two months later, well before any terrorist had been captured
rising to the level of sufficient importance to torture, the CIA was already
investigating its own possible criminal liability. This research began as early
as November 2001,51 while the first terrorist to be considered for torture,
Abu Zubaydah, was not captured until March 2002.52
Nor did this concern disappear in the face of the (presumably immediate) need to obtain whatever information Abu Zubaydah had. Indeed, in the
spring of 2002, the United States intelligence community believed itself to
be running against the clock, desperately trying to determine the structure
of al-Qaeda and its next targets while convinced that a nuclear attack was
imminent. The torture of Abu Zubaydah was believed to be necessary to
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Rizzo, supra note 1; Senate Armed Services Committee, supra note 34.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, supra note 37, at 19.
David Rose, Tortured Reasoning, Vanity Fair, 16 Dec. 2008, available at http://www.
vanityfair.com/magazine/2008/12/torture200812.

200

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 39

reveal information to prevent that attack.53 Still, the CIA insisted on obtaining legal approval for the specific tactics it desired to use.
A. The CIA’s Preoccupation with Prosecution
The CIA first approached its own General Counsel, and when that attorney
was uncertain about his response, continued to wait for the approval of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).54 The CIA first hoped for an advance declination to prosecute, which might have insulated CIA torturers from any future
prosecution.55 When no such promise was forthcoming, the CIA turned to
the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for an explanation of the extent
to which interrogators could apply pressure without running afoul of the
Torture Statute.56
By mid-April 2002, John Yoo and Jennifer Koester of OLC were researching the legal implications of proposed CIA tactics.57 By early July 2002, CIA
agents had met personally with Yoo in order to discuss twelve particular
techniques, and they quickly received a letter in response stating that Yoo
did not believe the techniques would violate any criminal statutes.58 But this
statement was not enough reassurance for the CIA to begin using torture.
Instead, the CIA continued to wait for a more convincing assurance that
there would be no criminal prosecutions.
On 24 July 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft gave oral approval of
ten out of twelve proposed techniques, including attention grasp, walling,
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facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers, and use of insects (Abu Zubaydah
was known to have a fear of insects), but still the CIA waited. On 26 July
2002, Attorney General Ashcroft orally approved the use of the waterboard
as well, but still the CIA waited for written authorization.59
On 1 August 2002, OLC completed two memos, signed by Jay Bybee
but authored by Yoo. One memo was a broad discussion of the elements
of the crime of torture and the conditions necessary to violate that statute
sufficiently to make prosecution likely,60 the other a specific examination
of the tactics the CIA had proposed.61 Only once the OLC had promised in
these formal memos that prosecutions were unlikely, and specifically outlined
the manner in which interrogators could act to avoid prosecutions, did the
“enhanced interrogation” of Abu Zubaydah begin.62 That interrogation was
limited to the eleven techniques that had been approved in the memos—a
final technique never received approval and, as far as we know now, was
not employed.63 Even these promises were insufficient to maintain the CIA’s
activities.
Over and over again, CIA agents and officials doubled back to reassure
themselves that no prosecutions were forthcoming. Interrogators remained
concerned about the legality of their actions. At one point, interrogators
voiced concerns that they were “approach[ing] the legal limit” of the interrogation techniques.64 Rodriguez responded that discussion of legality
should be avoided in emails, a clear reference to concerns about future
legal proceedings.65 When CIA agents became interested in using water
in what appeared to be a variation of waterboarding, they returned to the
CIA General Counsel’s office to check with attorneys before proceeding.66
In 2003, after President George W. Bush assured the public that detainees
were being treated “humanely,” the CIA became concerned again that its
actions might result in criminal prosecutions. CIA officials briefed members
of Congress and requested new written approval from OLC. Once again,
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until those reassurances of protection from prosecution were granted, the
CIA refrained from engaging in torture.67
In 2006, when the Supreme Court decided in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to detainees
at Guantanamo,68 the CIA’s concerns about criminal prosecution returned.
Once again, the CIA ceased torturing detainees until it was granted specific,
written reassurance from the OLC that its activities did not violate criminal
prohibitions.69 Indeed, the CIA appears to have returned often for this reassurance. In 2004, the OLC wrote a series of letters to the General Counsel
for the CIA, apparently in response to requests for specific clarification that
interrogation of specific detainees was authorized.70 In May 2005, the OLC
wrote two memos, providing once again the authority provided in the original
August 2002 memos.71 As noted above, in 2006 the CIA actually ceased
torturing detainees until it could be reassured that it was not violating any
criminal statutes. In 2007, it apparently required these reassurances again, as
67.
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the OLC provided still another memo in response to a CIA General Counsel
request for clarification of the legality of six interrogation tactics, as well as
four other letters regarding the legality of specific interrogations.72
Perhaps most importantly, mock burial was not employed by the CIA,
not because the OLC stated it would be illegal but because the OLC had
not yet made a determination on the technique, and the CIA did not want
to wait any longer for legal authorization.73 While the SSCI states that this
technique was never “formally considered by the OLC,” it appears the
tactic was abandoned because Yoo had already determined that it would
constitute torture.74 Either way, the possibility of prosecution (i.e. engaging
activity that had not received the blessing of the DOJ as “legal”) was enough
to deter the CIA.
This history suggests that the CIA, on both an individual and agencywide level, was highly concerned with the threat of legal sanctions. Further,
the CIA would have refrained from torturing detainees, based on its fear of
prosecution, if not for the legal approval it had received, and certainly if it
had been told that prosecution was likely.75 As John Rizzo, former General
Counsel to the CIA, admitted to a newspaper, “I could have stopped waterboarding before it happened.”76
72.
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To be sure, this concern was less than universal, and seemed to exist
only at the extremes. The CIA waited for legal approval to begin using its
twelve tactics, and once it gained that approval for a single detainee, it applied those techniques to numerous detainees without approval.77 CIA interrogation training in November 2002 already included two techniques that
had not been approved by the DOJ.78 The SSCI lists numerous times when
lawyers’ requests for review were not heeded79 or the advice of attorneys was
ignored.80 Indeed, the CIA regularly used techniques that were not approved,
or interrogated detainees for whom enhanced interrogation had not been
approved, or otherwise acted in contradiction with established guidelines.81
But at the margins, in terms of decisions whether or not to use torture
at all, the CIA continued to return to the OLC and other branches of government in order to ensure that it was still working within the bounds of its
legal authority. Of course, seeking legal approval means very little if lawyers
can bend law into meaninglessness. But in fact, the torture archive suggests
that the law was far from trivial, even to those lawyers who found ways to
authorize torture.
B. The Lawyers and the Criminal Law.
As noted above, DOJ refused to grant an advance declination to prosecute
to the CIA. The SSCI states that there is no evidence the request for a declination to prosecute ever reached the Attorney General,82 while the OPR
report states that Michael Chertoff refused to give this declination.83
But the OLC, led by Yoo, pursued narrow and at times incredible interpretations of relevant law in an apparent effort to insulate the CIA from legal
liability. While a full discussion of the flaws of Yoo’s analyses are beyond the
scope of this article, the majority of legal scholars agree that his analysis was
highly flawed, and in places blatantly contradicted established law.84 Central
to these criticisms are Yoo’s inclusion of defenses to possible prosecutions,85
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an inclusion that many claim was both inaccurate and inappropriate,86 as
well as his claims that the Torture Statute would only be violated if government agents successfully and purposefully caused a detainee a level of
pain “that would ordinarily be associated with . . . death, organ failure, or
serious impairment of body functions,”87 and that the President’s inherent
Commander in Chief authority would allow the commission of even this
level of abuse, as part of Executive wartime powers.88
Yet, even given the shocking inaccuracy of the above claims, the memos
show some restraint, given the history of the person writing them. Critics
of the memos acknowledge that Yoo’s own legal ideologies would have allowed for complete approval of any abuse committed under orders from the
Executive, as part of the Commander in Chief’s wartime powers.89 Yoo had
expressed this belief in prior writings.90 Moreover, Yoo was under no institutional constraints—he was working closely with the Vice President’s legal
advisor, David Addington, and was insulated from most official oversight.91
Yoo hesitated, but did in fact limit his final recommendations. This suggests
a surprising amount of influence from legal doctrine.
Yoo’s hesitance is evident in the time it took him to complete the
memos. Yoo and Koester began working on the memo on 11 April 2002.92
Koester wrote four drafts of the memo, each time responding to comments
Yoo made.93 In all, Yoo spent four months working on the memos, in the
face of perceived nuclear threat, when complete approval might have been
granted on the sole basis of a summary of his argument regarding executive
powers (which he had already published once). Indeed, he only added a
discussion of those powers after (and apparently in response to) a mid-July
meeting with then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.94 The defenses
portion of the memos, similarly criticized, was also a late addition seemingly
in response to that meeting.95
The memos did not suggest that all actions would be safe from prosecution. One warned that a jury likely would not be swayed by its reasoning. It
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further mentioned the authors’ inability to address the question of whether
“rogue” ICC prosecutors might attempt prosecution. The memo also specified
tactics that would go too far, including burning, and threats of imminent
death. These warnings were a response to Yoo’s examination of prior cases
where allegations of torture had resulted in lawsuits (attached as an appendix
to the memo).96 Whether Yoo was genuinely concerned with the law or only
protecting his clients from prosecution, the legal precedent proved too great
to distinguish in these cases.
Yoo has been criticized for finding ways to say yes to every request made
by the CIA,97 but in fact he did say no to one tactic. As was noted above,
Yoo never addressed mock burial in writing, suggesting his reluctance to
contradict a legal proscription he could not distinguish.
IV. EXEMPLIFYING THE FAILURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT
AND SOCIALIZATION OF ELITES
The case study of the US torture policy highlights the fundamental weakness
of traditional efforts to curb state abuse: namely, the reliance on discovery of
abuse as it occurs. The SSCI’s report demonstrates that the CIA consciously
planned for no party, ever, to discover their actions. Seemingly verifying
threats made to Abu Zubaydah that he would only leave CIA custody in
a coffin-shaped box,98 and to Hambali that “he would never go to court,
because ‘we can never let the world know what I have done to you,’”99 the
CIA took extreme steps to make sure its program remained hidden, until its
disclosure in 2004. Very few were informed of the program. Ambassadors,
warned of the program so they would not hear about it from officials of
countries hosting blacksites, were instructed not to discuss the program with
any other State Department officials.100 Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were not briefed on the program
before it began.101 This was apparently purposeful, out of awareness that,
at least Secretary of State Powell, would strongly oppose the program.102 It
appears a conscious decision was made not to brief the President in 2002,
and that he was not briefed on the program until 2006 (although his own
memoir contradicts this claim).103
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But the most telling factor of the CIA’s plan of secrecy is the lengths
to which it was willing to go regarding the disposal of detainees. In July
2002, even as legal approval for “enhanced interrogation” was still being
contemplated, the CIA discussed tactics that might be necessary should
Abu Zubaydah die while being interrogated. The CIA determined that the
best option would be cremation. The CIA interrogation team emphasized
the need to make sure that Abu Zubaydah never revealed what had been
done to him, specifically by keeping him isolated and incommunicado. CIA
headquarters agreed, stating
There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will
never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others
and/or has the opportunity to be released. . . . [Abu Zubaydah] should remain
incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah]
from being turned over to another country.104

In other words, monitoring and oversight was specifically and consciously
avoided. The program was shielded from any possible disagreeing voices. The
torture, therefore, could not be prevented via concerns of public opinion,
pressure from international or domestic NGOs, or institutional oversight,
as torturers were assured that their activities would never be discovered.
It is unclear whether disclosure to the public would have mattered.
While polls disagree regarding the precise percentage of the population that
accepts torture as a legitimate interrogation tactic, it appears that a majority
of the public approves of the use of torture, at least in rare circumstances.105
An analysis of public opinion polls over eight years suggests that the public
is at least evenly split regarding acceptance of torture.106 This even split
would be unlikely to exert the type of political pressure necessary to fully
disincentivize the use of torture (and in fact, it appears it was not).
CIA officials were aware of this opening in public opinion, and strategically utilized it. Once discovery of the program appeared inevitable, the
Deputy Director of the Counter Terrorism Center emphasized the need to
“sell” the program to the public, so that Congress would not cut authorities
or funds.107 Shortly thereafter, CIA officials began appearing on news programs, emphasizing the “successes” of the program.108 Claiming that torture
had saved lives was a preemptive public relations strategy that CIA officials
exploited to prevent public pressure to abandon the program.
104.
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106.
107.
108.
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Rather than taking action from the outside, some have argued that instilling human rights norms in government actors could lessen the likelihood
of human rights violations, such as torture.109 One might hope that torture
will cease to exist if those who are in a position to torture are socialized so
that such behavior is “unimaginable”.110
Yet here, again, the post-2001 use of torture by the CIA highlights the
problems of relying on this approach. First, the relevant actors in this case
took care to avoid the watchful eyes of those members of the executive
branch who had been successfully socialized to respect human rights, i.e.
the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Second, the development
of the program by, seemingly, very few actors shows the inherent difficulty
of successfully socializing every single member of the executive branch.
Coercive interrogations appear to have been largely led by one CIA officer
who had been involved in abusive interrogation over the course of the 1980s
and was put in charge of the interrogation program in fall of 2002,111 as
well as a pair of contractors who had no training in interrogation.112 In such
cases, it is unlikely that human rights training could be assured; certainly, it
seems unlikely that all such actors could be socialized to the point where
human rights abuses are “unimaginable.”
Finally, even where socialization has been successful, personal reluctance
may be overcome in the climate of fear and irrationality that follows violent
attacks. The tendency to follow orders even in the face of extreme abuses is
well documented,113 particularly where the orders given are justified based
on a cause the actor identifies with and finds to be convincing.114
This dynamic can be seen in the SSCI Report as well. The Report shows
that, on orders from CIA headquarters, interrogation teams continued to
torture detainees even in the cases of detainees who, they believed, were
compliant.115 The Report describes the team’s negative reaction to this pressure,116 and even the personal dislike (at least some) interrogators had of
their activities:
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CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being disturbed by the use
of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:
• August 5, 2002: “want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly
not a place he’s ever been before in his medical career. . . It is visually and
psychologically very uncomfortable.”
• August 8, 2002: “Today’s first session. . . had a profound effect on all staff
members present. . . it seems the collective opinion that we should not go
much further . . . everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to
continue. . . we cannot guarantee how much longer.”
• August 8, 2002: “Several on the team profoundly affected. . . some to the
point of tears and choking up.”
• August 9, 2002: “two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer” away
from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA’s
enhanced interrogation techniques.”117

Yet the torture continued, suggesting once again that fostering respect for
human rights and personal aversion to torture is not the best way to protect
these interests.
Instead, we should look to what did work to prevent and pause the
torture, if only briefly, in the history of the CIA’s detention program. That
was the threat of criminal prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the discovery of the CIA’s institutionalized torture, there have
been repeated calls for “truth commissions” and tell-all reports to clear the
air and establish what exactly occurred.118 These calls are based on several
considerations, including the likelihood of prosecutions occurring, the usefulness of obtaining a full and honest retelling of what actually occurred
from 2002 to 2008, and a desire to allow victims the opportunity to make
their narratives known to the general public so that society can heal from
its wounds.119 In what appears to be a peak of desperation, the American
117.
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Civil Liberties Union called for the pardoning of those responsible for the
CIA’s use of torture, if only to reiterate to the public that torture is in fact a
crime, even if politicians refuse to pursue prosecutions.120
Those who have called for prosecutions have done so on the basis of the
legal obligations of the United States, the legal support for prosecutions, the
general effects on broader culture that are caused by a failure to prosecute,
and the need to silence continuing efforts to defend the program.121
This article suggests a more direct reason to strengthen calls for prosecution rather than truth commissions or national inquiries. Specifically, this
article suggests that prosecutions can work. As has been shown above, those
individuals responsible for instigating and perpetuating torture diligently
researched their own legal liability. The likelihood of prosecution was specifically evaluated and found to be negligible before offenders proceeded. In
moments when offenders believed they might be held criminally responsible
for their actions, the use of torture ceased. Specific tactics that individuals
or agencies believed might bring criminal responsibility were avoided.
The power of criminal sanctions is understandable when examined in
the context of criminological literature on deterrence. This literature reminds
us that the promise of deterrence must be evaluated in relation to the specific characteristics of the individuals one is trying to deter. While criminal
prohibitions of torture might not deter many individuals, the difficulty of
achieving policymaking positions in government make institutionalized
torture far more deterrable than most street crimes. This fact is evidenced
by the CIA’s long debates and hesitations regarding their own policy.
Importantly, this hesitation remained in the face of numerous other
protections from (noncriminal) liability that human rights scholars have
traditionally suggested as ways by which to curb human rights violations.
Many elite government actors had been socialized to respect human rights,
but this was overcome, in some cases by perceived need, and in other cases
by purposeful avoidance and concealment. Institutional oversight, therefore,
was doomed from the beginning. Yet somehow, the threat of criminal prosecution remained a powerful deterrent even in the face of the CIA’s faith
in its secrecy. This suggests not only that criminal prosecution can prevent
future abuses, but that it may work where nothing else will.
The CIA’s use of torture and its moments of hesitation, offer an important
reminder that government policies are imagined and carried out by individuals acting under the influence of their social situation and personal char120.
121.

Anthony D. Romero, Pardon Bush and Those Who Tortured, N.Y. Times, 8 Dec. 2014,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/pardon-bush-and-those-whotortured.html.
See, e.g., Francesco Messineo, “Extraordinary Renditions” and State Obligations to
Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu Omar Case in Italy, 7 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1023 (2009); Bassiouni, supra note 4.

2017

Deterring Torture

211

acteristics. It suggests that disciplines, such as criminology and psychology
may have far more to offer in this area, and that criminological, as well as
psychologically based research should be utilized by human rights activists,
rather than purely political science perspectives. Indeed, rather than insulating potential offenders, the complexity of government institutions appears to
provide the opportunity for potential criminal offenders to be refocused on
their own rational interests, and to see the possible conflict between their
own interests and potential criminal behavior.
This case study suggests that deterrence may be even more effective in
these circumstances than in response to the conventional criminal behavior
against which it is most often tested. It is possible, as I have suggested above,
that this strength is due to the high social investment of these actors. However, it is also possible that it is in part due to the uncertain ground upon
which the actors found themselves. Domestic criminal liability for torture
had only been available since 1994, and there have been no prosecutions
since that time.122 But the elite government actors involved in creating the
US torture policy were likely aware of its passage, and of the possibility of
criminal liability. This may have created a heightened perception of risk, i.e.
the amount of consideration and credence that these potential offenders gave
to the idea that they might be caught and prosecuted.123
Moreover, with the availability of legal personnel to explain the extent
of that risk, it was easy to investigate the matter rather than hazard a guess
and risk prosecution. The attorneys’ warnings that some, but not all activity
created a high risk of sanctions may have carried more weight at that point.
The opportunity to engage in some abusive questioning, even if refraining
from the extent of abuse originally desired, may have offered a desirable
compromise that also served to remind government actors to protect themselves from prosecution.
It is also interesting to note the restraint of government attorneys in
attempting to find legal justifications for clearly illegal behavior. These efforts show the need for further research to evaluate the strength of legal
socialization as another way to further the strength of the rule of law and
human rights.
In sum, this article presents a ray of hope, but also a warning. The fact
that the United States government officially instituted a torture policy in
the wake of the terror attacks of 2001 should not be seen as proof that all
states behave exceptionally, ignoring the rule of law and human rights in
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times of crisis. To the contrary, statutes prohibiting the use of torture may
be extremely effective in preventing, rather than merely rectifying, abuses.
The rule of law showed its weaknesses, but also its strengths in the CIA’s
moments of debate and hesitation.
Deterrence theory also suggests that the failure to prosecute is likely
to breed more lawless behavior if it is allowed to stand. Perception of risk
is strongly affected by past experience or knowledge of criminal behavior,
and whether that behavior was punished.124 The history of torture in the
United States post-2001, the CIA’s careful research into the legality and
possible criminal liability of CIA actions, and Yoo’s legal research performed
into prior cases, highlight the prominence of prior examples of criminality
and responses to that criminality in the rational analyses of these particular
types of offenders.
These facts underscore the need to press for criminal prosecutions internationally and domestically. The CIA’s enhanced interrogation program shows
both the promises and the failures of human rights law to date. Here, we
have an opportunity for prosecutors to engage in behavior that will actually
prevent crime. All that is required is for those prosecutors to act.
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